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MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
DO NOT BELONG IN NURSING HOME CONTRACTS
WITH RESIDENTS
Ann E. Krasuski*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court endorses them. Businesses, lending institutions,
and health care providers often rely on them. Employers impose them
2on their employees.' State legislatures curb their use. Arbitration
providers themselves refuse to enforce them in certain disputes,3 and
consumer advocates typically oppose them.4 Originally intended for
arm's length transactions between parties in relatively equal bargaining
positions,5 arbitration agreements are appearing with greater frequency
in contracts of all varieties.' They have become a staple in consumer
contracts, and have even been spotted on a box of Cheerios. Recently,
seeing an opportunity to avoid costly and reputation-breaking litigation,
nursing homes have begun to incorporate them in admission
agreements with residents. These arbitration agreements may be good
for nursing homes, but they are expensive proceedings in a forum
generally unfavorable to consumers.
Many residents and their families do not read carefully - if at
all- the admission materials they are given and asked to sign upon
*Executive Text Editor, DePaul Journal of Health Care Law. B.A., University of
Indiana at Bloomington; M.A., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., DePaul University
College of Law.
' Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference For Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996).
2 See, e.g., ARK CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (2001) (exempting personal injury and
tort matters from enforcement of arbitration agreements); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5-
401(c)(3) (1991) (exempting tort claims); MONT. CODE ANN. 27-5-114(2)(a) (1995)
(exempting personal injury claims).
3 See Kersten Norlin, AAA Announces Change in Health Care Policy, AM. ARB.
AsS'N (2002), athttp://www.adr.org.
4 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2002), at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF 11OA.PDF.
' Sternlight, supra note 1, at 641.
6 See Jane Spencer, Signing A way Your Right to Sue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2003,
at D1.
' Ellie Winninghoff, A fair fight? Arbitration may not always be in your best
interest, CIIi. TRw., Nov. 24, 1994, at C1.
8 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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admission, an exceedingly stressful time for most families. 9 Often the
need for nursing home care arises unexpectedly, and families have little
time to investigate their options or become informed consumers.l0
Once at the nursing home, they are handed an admissions packet
containing numerous documents that detail, among other things,"
services available in the facility, charges for the services, Medicare and
Medicaid eligibility, resident rights, advance directives, the bed-hold
policy, and policies governing resident conduct.'2 Often inserted
among these papers is an arbitration agreement that might read
something like this:
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, any action, dispute, claim
or controversy of any kind (e.g., whether in contract or in tort,
statutory or common law, legal or equitable, or otherwise) now
existing or hereafter arising between the parties in any way arising
out of, pertaining to or in connection with the provision of health
care services, any agreement between the parties, the provision of
any other goods or services by the Health Care Center or other
transactions, contracts or agreements of any kind whatsoever, any
past, present or future incidents, omissions, acts, errors, practices, or
occurrence causing injury to either party whereby the other party or
its agents, employees or representatives may be liable, in whole or
in part, or any other aspect of the past, present or future
relationships between the parties shall be resolved by binding
arbitration administered by the National Health Lawyers
Association (the 'NHLA'). 3
Even if the resident or her family read the arbitration agreement,
they might not understand it, or realize that by signing it, they are
forgoing the ability to bring claims against the facility in court. In
other words, they may not understand that they are waiving their right
to a jury trial by agreeing to binding arbitration. Moreover, at
' See Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, 109 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003); Raiteri ex rel Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-
CV, 2003 WL 23094413 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003).
'0 Denese A. Vlosky, "Say-so" as a predictor of nursing home readiness, 93 J.
FAM. CONSUMER SCI. 59 (2001).
" Maureen Armour, A Nursing Home's Good Faith Duty "To" Care: Redefining
A Fragile Relationship Using the Law of Contract, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 217, 225
(describing an admissions packet that contains fifty-one separate items).
,242 C.F.R. § 483.10 (2004).
'3 Briarcliff Nursing Home v. Turcotte, 2004 WL 1418698, Nos. 1012193,
1012195, at *1 (Ala. June 25, 2004).
"4 Romano ex re. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. App.
2003), reh 'g denied,
Manor Care, Inc. v. Romano, 874 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 2004) (the nursing home
administrator herself did not understand the meaning of the arbitration agreement).
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admission the focus is on obtaining needed care, and families do not
anticipate that their loved one will be harmed or abused, precipitating
the decision to take action against the nursing home.
In arbitration, a privately retained arbitrator or arbitration panel
renders a decision instead of a judge or jury. The arbitrator's decision
is generally binding and cannot be appealed in court. Perceived
benefits of cost-savings, accelerated judgment and potential capacity to
preserve long-term relationships are touted by advocates of
arbitration, yet these benefits are often illusory for nursing home
residents and other consumers.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has accorded favored status to
arbitration agreements,' 6 and many states have adopted this preference
for arbitration over litigation as well. 7 Consequently, residents and
their families face enormous hurdles in the courts when attempting to
defeat arbitration agreements employed by nursing homes. But the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, whose regulations govern
the vast majority of the nation's nursing homes, has forgone the
opportunity to make arbitration agreements in nursing homes
unenforceable." In light of these trends, Congress should amend the
Federal Nursing Home Reform Law' 9 to offer uniform protection to
nursing home residents from involuntary arbitration agreements.
Doing so would recognize the public policy that nursing home residents
warrant special protection in addition to that afforded by regulatory
oversight. °
This article explores the increasing use of arbitration
agreements in nursing homes by examining case law and related
developments. Part Two describes arbitration agreements and the
nursing home industry's motivations for including them in admission
contracts. Part Three discusses the Federal Arbitration Act, its
interpretation by the Supreme Court and surveys nursing home
arbitration case law. Part Four discusses why these agreements should
" Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and
Reality, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 155 (1997).
16 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983).
'" See, e.g., Ericksen v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251, 257 (Cal. 1983); Schaefer
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ohio 1992); Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp.,
750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999); Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., L.L.C., 813
N.E.2d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), reh'g denied (citing Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Stinnett, 698 N.E.2d 339, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
," See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
'9 Pub. Law No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-
3, 1396r).
20 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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be barred in nursing homes and Part Five concludes that Congress
should prohibit their use by the nursing home industry.
II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN NURSING HOME
ADMISSION CONTRACTS
A. The Appeal of Arbitration to the Nursing Home Industry
Hit with attention-grabbing jury awards, forced to pay larger
settlements, and faced with rapidly increasing liability insurance
premiums,2' nursing homes are continually looking for ways to reduce
their liability exposure.12 Imposing mandatory arbitration agreements
on residents and their families is a relatively easy and cost-effective
method to achieve this goal.
Until recently, attorneys were reluctant to take on cases against
nursing homes. 3 Nursing home residents are generally elderly, have
pre-existing medical problems, and are not likely to have potential lost
earnings, factors that limit the opportunity for damages.24 But as juries
have awarded increased compensatory and punitive damages, nursing
home litigation has become a burgeoning area of litigation for trial
25
attorneys.
Jury awards against nursing homes have increased significantly.
Between the years 1987 and 1994 the mean award in a nursing-home
negligence case more than doubled from $238,285 to $525,853.26
Juries have increased compensatory awards fourfold from 1995 to 1998
to an average of $1.3 million. 2' Record awards include $95.1 million --
$94.7 million of which represents punitive damages-- for abuse,
negligence and fraud when a 66-year old resident fell out of bed and
" See Mary Flood, Nursing Homes Are Hit by Rise in Big Verdicts, WALL ST. J.,
(TEX. J.), July 1, 1998, at T1; Edward Felsenthal, Jury Awards Rise for Improper
Care of Elderly, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at B .; Michael Moss, Nursing Homes
Get Punished By Irate Jurors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1998, at B 1.
22 See Kathleen Vickery, Building a Foundation of Trust, PROVIDER, JULY 2003,
at 26 (2003); Mike Cason, Nursing Homes Try Lawsuit Stoppers, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Sept. 22, 2002, at 01.
23 Patricia S. Harris, Defense Perspective Litigating Nursing Home Cases, 36
ARK. LAW 15 (2001).
24 Id.; See also Flood, supra note 21 at T1.
2 See Amy J. Conner & Bill Ibelle, Nursing Home Plaintiffs Targeted By Tort
'Reform,' LAW. WKLY. USA, Sept. 1, 2003, at
http://www.slackdavis.com/news-article.php/newsjid/argval/25 1/argname/backlink/
argval/index.
26 See Felsenthal, supra note 21.
27 See Moss, supra note 21.
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sustained a broken shoulder and hip;" $6.3 million to the family of a
resident with dementia, who eventually drowned in a pond after leaving
the nursing home undetected several times; 29 and a $5.3 million verdict
to a resident attacked by fire ants in an Alabama nursing home.30 One
study reported that average settlement and verdict amounts for injuries
typical in nursing homes included, $973,349.92 for bed sores,
$802,061.83 for wandering (death), and $353,983.09 for falls.'
In an effort to insulate themselves from litigation and what
defendants often characterize as the "runaway jury, 32 nursing homes
have increasingly turned to arbitration.33 Arbitration offers nursing
homes a number of advantages over litigation. Arbitrators tend to issue
lower awards than juries.m Thus, by effectively capping damages,
arbitration acts as a type of private tort reform. Additionally, because
the arbitration clauses are drafted by nursing-home attorneys, nursing
homes have the opportunity to control the terms of the arbitration to
favor themselves and disadvantage residents. The agreements may
specify an industry-friendly arbitration provider to administer the
arbitration proceeding,35 select a location inconvenient to residents for
the arbitration, place time limits on filing of complaints less than that
28 Id. The award was later reduced to about $3.1 million. Id The large jury award
was likely based on the exceptionally egregious behavior of the nursing home
administration in refusing to address understaffing, which contributed to the
residents' injury. See in re Conservatorship of Gregory, 80 Cal. App. 4th 514 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000).
29 Moss, supra note 21.
'0 Conner, supra note 25.
" NELL SUGARMAN ET. AL., ASS'N TRIAL LAW. AM, MEDICAL ERRORS FROM
WHICH THE ELDERLY ARE AT RISK AND THE USE OF LITIGATION To PROTECT THE
ELDERLY FROM SUCH ERRORS 2627 (2000).
32 See Conner, supra note 25.
3 See CALIFORNIA ADVOCATES FOR NURSING HOME REFORM, ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS: WHY THEY SHOULD BE PROHIBITED IN ADMISSION AGREEMENTS
(2004), available at
http://www.canhr.org/publications/newsletters/advocate/adv_0903.htm (quoting a
nursing home industry attorney: "The greatest appeal of arbitration for the provider is
that this process takes the case out of the hands of the jury (whose biases we are all
too familiar with) and entrusts it to a neutral arbitrator"); Cason, supra note 22.
34 Alan Bloom et. al., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 16
WHrrI'rER L. REv. 61, 76 (1995).
" Briarcliff Nursing Home v. Turcotte, 2004 WL 1418698, Nos. 1012193,
1012195, at *3 (Ala. June 25, 2004). See also Bloom, supra note 34, at 63, 84 (stating
that in a survey conducted by the National Health Lawyers Association the most
important factor that would encourage the health care industry to use alternative
dispute resolution was the assurance that the arbitrator or mediator had health industry
experience, and "The key in arbitration is three things: 1) selection of the arbitrator, 2)
selection of the arbitrator, and 3) selection of the arbitrator").
2004]
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provided by the statute of limitations,36 and limit awards by capping
damages and excluding attorneys' fees in contravention of statutes that
provide for them.37
The benefits of arbitration to nursing homes must be significant.
Some nursing home chains even pay the majority of the residents'
arbitration fees, a practice that can add up to thousands of dollars.38
Arbitration is so attractive to the industry that, according to one
plaintiff's attorney, a nursing home chain in Florida orchestrated a sale
of its twelve facilities in order to force all the residents to sign new
admission agreements containing arbitration agreements.3 9  The
attorney for the nursing home chain contends the reason for the sale
was that it would lower the assets of the chain and would give plaintiff
attorneys less incentive to sue the nursing homes and thereby decrease
its insurance premiums. 4°  Whatever the true motivation, the sale
illustrates how anxious the nursing home industry is to avoid litigation.
Mandatory arbitration agreements provide a relatively simple method
of doing so.
B. Use of the Agreements
It is unknown how widespread the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements is among members of the nursing home industry. Even if
the nursing home industry tracks this information, it does not publish it
or otherwise share it. However, most of the nation's largest nursing
home chains, including Integrated Health Services, Beverly Industries,
Kindred Healthcare, and Mariner, include arbitration agreements in
their admissions packets.4'
The mandatory arbitration agreements generally provide that all
disputes arising under the admission agreement are subject to
arbitration, and thus require both the nursing home and residents to
forgo litigation. Some agreements, however, are explicitly one-sided
and exclude from arbitration claims that a nursing home would bring,
36 Ziva Branstetter, Nursing Home Policy Challenged, TULSA WORLD, March 4,
2002, at 1.
" See Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 63 (Fla. App.
2003), reh 'g denied, Manor Care, Inc. v. Romano, 874 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 2004)
38 Cason, supra note 22; Algayer v. Health Ctr. of Panama City, Inc., 866 So. 2d
75, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), reh 'g denied, Feb. 20, 2004.
'9 Cary Davis, Lawsuit Challenges Nursing Home Deal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2000, at 8.
40 id,
41 See Beverly Seeks To Reduce Future Patient Liability Costs, 2 MEALEY'S
LiTIG. REP.: NURSING HOMES 12 (2002); Telephone Interview with an industry
representative, who requested anonymity (April 9, 2004) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Conversation].
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such as claims for payment and collections. 4 ' Even when the
agreements do not so blatantly favor nursing homes, they are
nevertheless inherently one-sided. They benefit nursing homes because
they typically would only sue residents over nonpayment, generally a
straightforward issue that, unlike negligence claims, may be
appropriate for arbitration.
Some contracts are further skewed against residents. They cap
damages and require the parties to pay their own attorney fees, even
when these terms contravene state statutes governing nursing home
litigation. Some agreements have required that the arbitration take
place in a distant state, presenting another barrier to residents and other
plaintiffs.44 Many of the arbitration agreements specify the arbitration
provider. 5 Nursing homes frequently select the American Health
Lawyers Association (AHLA) as their arbitration provider, a practice
criticized by resident advocates, who claim that the AHLA consists of
lawyers who typically represent health care providers and thus are more
likely to rule in favor of nursing homes.47 Additionally, in an attempt to
limit their liability by precluding wrongful death claims by residents'
families, the agreements commonly purport to bind heirs, the estate and
assigns of residents in addition to the residents themselves.48
In order to avoid being bound by state arbitration laws that
impose specific requirements on the format, language or terms of
arbitration clauses, nursing home arbitration agreements typically
invoke the Federal Arbitration Act, which preempts arbitration-specific
42 See NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, ARK. DHS FINDS THAT
NURSING FACILITY'S MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT VIOLATES FEDERAL
AND STATE NURSING FACILITY LAW (2003), at
http://www.nsclc.org/news/03/03/arkansas mandatory-arbitration.htm.
41 See Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 63 (Ha. App.
2003), reh'g denied, Manor Care, Inc. v. Romano, 874 So.2d 1192 (Ha. 2004).
" Branstetter, supra note 36, at 1 (an Oklahoma nursing home's arbitration
agreement requires residents to travel to New Mexico at their own expense for
arbitration); Northport Health Serv. v. Raidoja, 851 So. 2d 234, 235 (Ha. App. 2003)
(a provision in a Florida nursing home's arbitration agreement requires that
arbitration take place in Alabama).
41 See, e.g., Briarcliff, 2004 WL 226087 at *1; Sanford v. Castleton Health Care
Ctr., L.L.C., 813 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Raiteri ex rel Cox v. NHC
Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413, at
*9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003); Algayer v. Health Ctr. of Panama City, Inc., 866
So. 2d 75, 76 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), reh denied, Feb. 20, 2004.
46 See, e.g. Biarcliff, 2004 WL 226087 at *1; Sanford, 813 N.E.2d at 415;
Raiter, 2003 WL 23094413 at *9; Algayer, 866 So.2d at 76.
41 See Brarcliff, 2004 WL 226087 at *3. See also http://www.ahla.org/adr/.
4' Flaum v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., No. B157317, 2002 WL 31852905 at
*6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec 20, 2002).
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state laws. 49 This practice also permits nursing home chains with
facilities in several states to use uniform contracts. °
III. CASE LAW
A. Background
The adoption of arbitration agreements by the nursing home industry
has been fueled not only by its effort to minimize damages awarded
against nursing homes, but has occurred in light of the national policy
favoring arbitration set forth by the Supreme Court in construing the
Federal Arbitration Act.
Although the purpose and scope of the FAA was limited when
it was enacted in 1925, today its influence is far-reaching, presenting a
formidable hurdle for consumers who challenge arbitration clauses.
When Congress enacted the FAA,5' its purpose was twofold: to reverse
the longstanding judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements and to
place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts.5
Prior to the passage of the Act, federal courts did not consider
agreements to arbitrate disputes binding, and they routinely disregarded
them.53 As contemporaneous legislative materials indicate, Congress
intended the Act to apply only to disputes brought in federal courts.
Thus, the Act was not designed as a substantive law that would
49 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
50 Some attorneys, however, suggest drafting arbitration agreements to comply
with state arbitration law, presumably in case state courts find the FAA inapplicable.
ARIc D. MARTIN, OHIO HEALTH CARE ASS'N, REvISrrING ARBITRATION:
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE ADMISSION PROCESS (2003), at
http://www.rolfgoffman.coi.VOHCA%20Arbitration%202003.pdf.
5 See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-37 (2000). The Act was
originally passed as the United States Arbitration Act. Section 2, the key provision of
the Act, provides, "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."
52 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Volt Info.
Sci., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of LeLand Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474
(1989).
" Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REv. 265, 270 (1926).
14 See Id. at 265, 267; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 417-418 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FAA applies only in
federal courts).
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preempt state laws, but was to serve only as a procedural and remedial
statute.55 Additionally, Congress intended the Act to govern contracts
between merchants with relatively equal bargaining power who
voluntarily entered arbitration agreements, whereas today arbitration
agreements are pervasive in consumer contracts.
56
Contrary to the intended purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act,
the Supreme Court has steadily expanded the scope of the FAA since
the 1980'S. 57 The Court's expansive view is grounded primarily in its
own characterization of the FAA as a reflection of the national policy
favoring arbitration, first articulated in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation:
[t]he courts of appeals have ... consistently concluded that
questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration. We agree. The
Arbitration Act established that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability
With this opinion, the Court went beyond the intended purpose
of the FAA to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other
contracts and signaled a preference for arbitration over litigation. One
commentator argues that this "federal policy favoring arbitration" is
nothing more than a "myth," noting that the court did not provide a
basis for this policy, but merely relied on lower court cases similarly
devoid of supporting rationale.59 Nevertheless, this policy has been the
source of the Court's generous interpretation of the FAA in subsequent
cases.
The Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of the
FAA when it determined the Act to be substantive law, enacted
's An article written by the drafters of the FAA states, "The statute as drawn
establishes a procedure in the federal courts for the enforcement of certain arbitration
agreements. It is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself what
contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws. To be sure, whether or not a contract
exists is a question of the substantive law of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was
made." Cohen, supra note 53, at 276.
56 Sternlight, supra note 1, at 647; Cohen, supra note 53, at 281; Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
17 Stemlight, supra note 1, at 660.
18 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983).
59 Id.
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pursuant to Congress' commerce authority.60 The Court reasoned that
the FAA is applicable in state courts and preempts state laws as long
the contract at issue evidences a transaction involving interstate
commerce.6 ' The Court has thus undermined state statutes designed to
protect consumers and others who lack meaningful bargaining power
61
when entering contracts.
Further limiting the ability of consumers to invalidate
mandatory arbitration clauses, the Court has adopted an exceedingly
broad construction of what constitutes interstate commerce. The Court
engaged in extensive analysis of the FAA's "involving commerce"
language, reasoning that the word "involving" evidenced Congress'
intent to exercise its commerce power to the full, thus calling for an
expansive interpretation. Accordingly, it enforced an arbitration
agreement between a homeowner and termite control company, finding
the interstate commerce requirement satisfied merely because the
company had offices in other states and because the materials and
equipment it used came from out of state.6 In a recent decision, the
Court further expanded the reach of the FAA when it held that a bank
loan to a developer represented an action involving interstate commerce
because the developer would use portions of the loan to conduct
business out of state, and the loan was secured by assets consisting of
inventory assembled from raw materials from out of state.65
Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to invalidate arbitration
agreements, there are few methods to defeat mandatory arbitration
agreements. The Court has discerned only two exceptions to the
enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA: first, in cases
that do not involve interstate commerce, and second, as provided in the
Act, "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
60 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting).
61 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
62 Id. (enforcing an arbitration agreement between a franchiser and franchisees
even though the state statute at issue required judicial consideration of disputes,
reasoning that the state law was in conflict with the FAA and thus in violation of the
supremacy clause); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)
(finding the FAA preempts a state law that requires notice of an arbitration clause to
appear on the first page of the contract); Allied-Bruce Terminex Co. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265 (1995) (enforcing an arbitration agreement between a homeowner and
termite company despite a state statute making all pre-dispute arbitration agreements
unenforceable).
63 Allied-Bruce Terminex Co., 513 U.S. at 277.
Id. at 282.
61 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003).
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of any contract," i.e. traditional contract defenses such as fraud, duress
and unconscionability.66
Plaintiffs commonly rely on contract defenses when arguing
against nursing home motions to compel arbitration, and depending on
the state, have had some success defeating arbitration with these
arguments. However, under the Supreme Court's expansive
interpretation of interstate commerce, few arbitration agreements are
immune from the FAA, and plaintiffs rarely prevail when they argue
that the admission agreement does not evidence a transaction involving
interstate commerce. As an Alabama Supreme Court opinion noted, "it
would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or
commercial activity that one could, with any confidence, declare
beyond the reach of ... the FAA.
' 67
B. Nursing Home Arbitration Case Law
Case law about nursing home arbitration agreements has developed
fairly recently. 68 Although the first case to reach a state appellate court
was decided in 1993,69 the majority of cases have been heard since
1999.70 Altogether, state courts have decided approximately thirty
cases at the time of this writing.
The cases arise when plaintiffs, typically spouses, children, or
the estate of the resident, bring suit against the nursing home and, in
response, the facility files a motion to compel arbitration. To defeat
arbitration agreements, plaintiffs argue that the terms of the agreement
are unconscionable, that they signed the agreement under
circumstances that make it procedurally unconscionable, or that they
did not sign or did not have authority to sign the agreement on behalf of
the resident, who did not have the capacity or was otherwise unable to
sign the agreement herself. Additionally, some plaintiffs attempt to
demonstrate that the agreement is not subject to the FAA because it
does not involve interstate commerce, but rather is governed by a state
law that invalidates the arbitration agreement. Other plaintiffs have
66 Southland Corp., 465 U.S at 10-11.
67 Service Corp. Int'l. v. Fulmer, 883 So. 2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003).
68 Interestingly, an article published in 1985 advocated the use of binding
arbitration in nursing home contracts. See Harold L. Hirsh, Voluntary Binding
Arbitration, 34 NURSING HOMES 12 (1985).69 Timms v. Greene, 427 S.E.2d 642 (S.C. 1993).
70 An explanation for this recent trend is the Supreme Court's expansion of what
constitutes interstate commerce in Allied-Bruce Terminex Co., cited for making
arbitration agreements a staple in consumer contracts. W. Todd Harvey, Arbitration
Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Contracts. Are Nursing Home Residents
and Their Assignees Bound by Mandatory Arbitration Agreements? Not Necessarily,
39 J.T.L.A TRIAL 72, 72 (May 2003).
2004]
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advanced a creative, though consistently unsuccessful, argument that
contends the agreements violate provisions of Medicare and Medicaid
statutes. How courts rule on these arguments varies, depending on
state law.
1. Interstate Commerce
Because of the national policy favoring arbitration, courts will enforce
contracts subject to the FAA. Thus, plaintiffs have argued that the
arbitration agreement they signed does not evidence a transaction
involving interstate commerce and therefore is not governed by the
FAA. To date, there only a few cases that consider the issue.
In an early case decided before the Supreme Court defined what
constitutes interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held that a state statute prohibiting arbitration
of personal injury cases was not preempted by the FAA because the
interstate commerce requirement was not satisfied." The nursing home
contended that it engaged in interstate commerce by marketing its
services, hiring employees, and purchasing equipment from out of
state, by being a division of a Delaware partnership and by accepting
federal funds from Medicare and Medicaid. 72  Although the court
agreed "these factors could evidence the [facility's] involvement in
interstate commerce," it held that "their relationship to the agreement
between the Center and the respondent is insufficient to form the basis
of the contract between the parties. 73 In other words, the admissions
agreement itself did not represent a transaction involving commerce,
even though the nursing home's business practices and transactions
might.
Since the South Carolina case, however, plaintiffs have been
unsuccessful in defeating mandatory arbitration clauses by arguing that
they do not involve interstate commerce. A Texas court summarily
rejected the plaintiff's contention that the FAA did not apply for lack of
a connection to interstate commerce because the contract expressly
invoked the FAA.74 The Alabama Supreme Court has also enforced
71 Timms, 427 S.E.2d at 643-44.
72 Id. at 644.
73 Id. In refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement, the court also relied on
other considerations, including the fact that the arbitration agreement provided for
arbitration pursuant to the state arbitration act. Id. at 643.
74 In re Ledet, No.2003-CVT-001366-D3, 2004 WL 2945699 (Tex. App. Dec. 22,
2004). According to Texas case law, a contract need not invoke the FAA when the
defendant can demonstrate that the contract involves interstate commerce, but when
the parties agree that the FAA governs, Texas courts will not require proof of a
connection to interstate commerce. Id. at *2.
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arbitration agreements, but only after considering specific evidence of
interstate commerce. It assessed whether the nursing home's provision
of care to the resident had a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce." The court held that this test was satisfied because the
nursing home received reimbursement from Medicare, i.e., federal
funds that come from out of state, for a large portion of the resident's
care and purchased materials used to feed her, to provide her bedding
and to keep her clean from out of state.76 The "substantial effects" test
was later explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court when it adopted a
looser standard for determining interstate commerce, making it even
harder for plaintiffs to defeat arbitration agreements.77 Accordingly, the
Alabama Supreme Court has continued to view that nursing home
arbitration agreements involve interstate commerce.78
2. Unauthorized Signors
Questioning the authority of the party who signs the admissions
agreement to bind plaintiffs to the contract is a method that has met
with some success in the courts. However, the outcome of this
argument depends on state law and whether the signor is a third party,
usually a spouse or adult child, or the resident. There are generally four
situations where plaintiffs have raised signor issues to attack nursing
home motions to compel. First, family members who signed the
" McGuffey Health and Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson ex re. Jackson, 864 So. 2d 1061,
1063 (Ala. 2003).
76 Id. But see Community Care of Alabama, Inc. v. Davis, 850 So. 2d 283 (Ala.
2002). The court held the FAA was inapplicable under the particular circumstances of
this case. When the resident signed the arbitration agreement the nursing home's
license to conduct business in the state had been revoked. Thus, under state law, the
nursing home was not authorized to conduct business in Alabama, and any contracts it
entered in Alabama would be held void. However, the state law would be inapplicable
if the court found the primary purpose of the nursing home's business was interstate
in nature because then the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution would trump
the state law. Applying this narrower primary purpose test, the court found that the
operation of the nursing home constituted a localized business activity and that the
contract between the nursing home and the resident was based in labor, a primarily
intrastate activity. 1d. at 286-89.
7 The Court held, "Congress' Commerce Clause power 'may be exercised in
individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce' if in
the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent 'a general practice ...
subject to federal control."' Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57
(2003) (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
78 Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 987-88 (Ala. 2004),
reh'g denied, Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 2004 Ala. LEXIS 302 (Ala.
Apr. 16, 2004); See also Biarcliff, 2004 WL 1418698, at *5.
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admissions agreement on behalf of the resident have argued that the
resident did not confer proper legal authority on them to bind the
resident to a contract. Second, when the resident signed the admissions
agreement, family member plaintiffs have argued that the resident
could not bind family members who did not sign the contract. Third,
family members have contended that they are not bound by the
arbitration agreement because they signed it as their parent's
fiduciaries, but are suing in their capacities as executors of their
parent's estates. And finally, plaintiffs have questioned whether the
nursing home can rely on the arbitration agreement when its
representative has not signed the agreement.
3. Family Members
Not uncommonly, residents have diminished capacity, or are admitted
to nursing homes from hospitals while suffering from debilitating
conditions and cannot reasonably be expected to participate in the
admissions process, much less to fully comprehend admissions
agreements. Consequently, nursing home admissions staff regularly
ask that family members sign admissions agreements on behalf of
residents. This practice is not only universal for practical reasons, but
some state statutes authorize the resident's representative or next of kin
to admit residents to nursing facilities.79 Although residents often do
not sign the admissions agreement, ° nursing home staff seldom inquire
or even consider whether the resident has capacity to sign the
agreement herself or whether the signor has authority to admit the
resident into the nursing home or to bind the resident to a contract.81
Generally, this oversight is not much cause for controversy.8 2
However, when a resident or her family member sues a nursing home
'9 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1599.65(a) (2000) (requiring a nursing
home to explain its admission agreement to a prospective resident and to obtain the
resident's signature unless the resident is unable to understand or sign the contract
because of his or her medical condition, but noting, "This provision does not preclude
the facility from obtaining the signature of an agent, responsible party, or a legal
representative, if applicable").
'0 Gerald B. Taylor, Jr. & Kimberly R. Ward, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing
Home Admission Agreements: Are They Enforceable? (2004), at
http://www.beasleyallen.com/publications/gbt/arbitration in-nh-admission-agreeme
nt.pdf.
" See W.Todd Harvey, supra note 70, at 73; Marshall B. Kapp, The 'Voluntary'
Status of Nursing Facility Admissions: Legal, Practical and Public Policy
Implications, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 10 (1998).
82 But see Katherine C. Pearson, Traps for the Unwary in Nursing Home
Admission Agreements-Guarantor, Agent or Separate Promisor? 74 PA. B.ASS'N. Q.
139 (2003).
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for negligence or wrongful death, and the nursing home moves to
compel arbitration, lack of authority of the family member to sign the
agreement becomes a strong argument for its nullification.
State courts that have considered the issue have generally held
that family members who have not been granted explicit authority by
the resident to enter into a binding contract cannot hold the resident or
others to the contract.83 For instance, when the daughters of a deceased
resident sued as her successors-in-interest, a California court found the
resident lacked capacity to authorize her daughters to sign the
arbitration agreement. The court rejected the nursing home's analogy
to state statutes that authorize a responsible party or family members to
sign admission agreements, to make medical decisions, and to enforce
residents' rights on behalf of residents." The court reasoned that
because these laws do not include arbitration agreements among the
rights conferred to family members, the facility could not bind the
family to the agreement absent evidence the resident's children had
authority to sign the agreement.86  To hold otherwise, the court
concluded, would be "counterintuitive and contrary to legislative
intent. '
87
The court was also unpersuaded by the nursing home's
contention that, by signing the admissions agreement, the resident's
children represented they had authority to bind their mother to the
agreement."' The court observed, "a person cannot become the agent of
another merely by representing herself as such," but must be an actual
agent or represented as one by the resident.89
Another California court reached the same outcome even when
the resident had conferred legal authority to her daughter as durable
power of attorney for health care decisions.9 The court held the
authority of the resident's daughter was limited to making medical
decisions, and did not extend to binding her mother or her siblings, who
" See Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc., 99 Cal.App4th 298, 300-301 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002); Raiteri ex rel Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-
00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003);
Phillips v. Crofton Manor Inn, No. B156570, 2003 WL 21101478, at *4 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. May 15, 2003).
Pagarigan, 99 Cal.App.4th at 302.
85 Id. (defendant citing California Health and Safety Code §§ 1599.65 and 1418.8
and California Administrative Code, Title 22 § 7257).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Pagarigan, 99 Cal.App.4th at 301.
89 id.
0 Phillips v. Crofton Manor Inn, 2003 WL 21101478 (Cal.App. May 15, 2003).
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brought a wrongful death claim, to the arbitration agreement she had
signed.9
A Tennessee court similarly held the husband of a resident was
not authorized to bind his wife to the arbitration agreement.92
Paradoxically, according to the court, the resident was "sharper" than
her husband, but the facility had not even approached the resident.93
The court found there was no evidence that the husband had actual or
apparent authority to sign for his wife and waive her "very valuable"
right to a jury trial.94
Unlike the Tennessee and California courts, which examined
whether signors had express authority from residents to sign contracts
on their behalf, the Alabama Supreme Court ascertained only whether
the resident had any objection to her daughter admitting her to the
nursing home.95 Finding no such evidence, the court held the arbitration
contract was binding upon the resident.96
4. Estates
In a consolidated Alabama case, the adult children of two residents who
died in the same facility argued that the arbitration agreement they had
signed for their parents was not binding on them and thus did not
subject their wrongful death claims to arbitration. 9 The plaintiffs
contended that they signed the admissions agreement as fiduciary
parties, but raised wrongful death claims in their capacities as executor
and administratrix of their parents' estates. 98 They argued, in other
words, that signing as fiduciary parties for the residents while they
were alive could not bind them to their then non-existent wrongful
death claims.99 The court rejected this argument because the state's
9' Id. The court additionally noted that the daughter did not believe her status
under the durable power of attorney allowed her to make legal decisions, as evidenced
by the fact that she had sought appointment as a guardian ad litem for purposes of the
litigation. Id. at *5.
92 Raiteri ex re]Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-
R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003).
" Id at *9.94id.
9' The daughter had signed the admissions agreement on the line for guardian or
sponsor, though it does not appear from the case that she was her mother's legal
guardian. Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 987 (Ala. 2004),
reh'g denied, Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 2004 Ala. LEXIS 302 (Ala.
Apr. 16, 2004).
96 Id.
97 Briarcliff Nursing Home v. Turcotte, 2004 WL 1418698, Nos. 1012193,
1012195, at *2-3 (Ala. June 25, 2004).
98 Id.
99d.
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wrongful death statute provides that a personal representative may sue
for wrongful death provided the testator or intestate could have
commenced the action had the defendant's act or omission not caused
death.' ° Accordingly, the court reasoned that the residents could not
have sued the nursing home in court because they had agreed to
arbitrate their claims and therefore their executor and administratrix
were also precluded from litigating in court.'0'
5. Residents
Many nursing home arbitration agreements explicitly purport to bind
third parties as well as the resident. For example, an agreement used by
a California nursing home contained a provision binding "the heirs,
representatives, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns" of
the resident."2 However, in a rare case where the resident signed the
admission agreement, the court was skeptical that this provision was
binding on the resident's daughter, who sued the nursing home for
negligence as executor of her father's estate and for wrongful death on
her own behalf.' °3 In light of a case that held an arbitration agreement
cannot bind the heirs of a signor if they themselves did not sign the
agreement, the court remanded the issue of whether the claims the
daughter brought on her own behalf could be subject to arbitration.'04
6. Nursing Home Staff
In a few cases, plaintiffs have attempted to overcome arbitration
agreements by arguing that the contract was not binding on them for
failure of a nursing home representative to sign it or sign it properly.
This argument has rarely proved successful for plaintiffs.
In two Florida cases, plaintiffs contended they could not be held
to the arbitration agreements they signed because nursing home staff
failed to sign the agreement, or they signed it on the wrong line.'05 The
courts nevertheless granted the facilities' motions to compel arbitration,
reasoning that mutuality of assent can be demonstrated in ways other
'00 Id. cifingALA. CODE § 6-5-410(a) (1993).
I0 Id. at *2-3; Wrongful death claims may have more success in other states,
where case law and wrongful death statutes create a new cause of action that arises
only upon the death of the injured person. See Taylor, supra note 80, at 14-16.
'0' Flaum v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., No. B 157317, 2002 WL 31852905,
at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec 20, 2002).
103 Id.
'0' Id. citing Bruckner v. Tamarin, 98 Cal.App.4th 140 (2002).
'05 Integrated Health Servs. of Green Briar, Inc. v. Lopez-Silvero, 827 So. 2d 338,
339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Consol. Res. Healthcare Fund I, Ltd., v. Fenelus, 853
So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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than a signature, and that the nursing homes had shown their assent by
performing under the contract and providing care to the residents.'
6
Some plaintiffs who included the nursing homes' corporate
owners as defendants in their negligence suits, argued that the owners
could not rely on the arbitration agreements to compel arbitration
because the owners were not parties to their contracts with the nursing
homes. .7 Thus, even if the nursing home succeeded in binding the
plaintiffs to the arbitration agreements, they would still be able to sue
the owners in court. A California court held the corporate defendants
were entitled to invoke the arbitration agreement because the plaintiffs
alleged in their complaint that they were the owners, operators and
managers of the nursing home,0 8 and as such were parties to the
contract. A Florida court, asked to decide a similar claim, remanded it
for a determination whether the corporate defendant was a party, or in
the alternative, a third-party beneficiary of the agreement, allowing it to
invoke the agreement.'09
7 Unconscionability and Contracts of Adhesion
Along with signor issues, one of the most common methods used by
plaintiffs in arguing against arbitration is attempting to demonstrate
that the arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion or that its terms
or the circumstances in which it was executed are unconscionable. °"0
Admitting a loved one to a nursing home is an overwhelming and
stressful undertaking for families, whom are often fraught with guilt
over the decision to place their family members in nursing homes,
which are frequent subjects of negative press and public perception."'
If families give any thought to the admissions agreement they are
signing, they probably do not consider whether it contains a mandatory
arbitration agreement. Moreover, facility staff are not required to point
out the arbitration clause or explain the ramifications of mandatory
arbitration. Given such circumstances, plaintiffs frequently argue that
the agreements are procedurally unconscionable.
107 Flaum, 2002 WL 31852905, at *6; Estate of Blanchard v. Central Park Lodges,
Inc., 805 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
o Flaum, 2002 WL 31852905, at *6.
'" Blanchard, 805 So.2d at 9.
"o See, e.g. Raiteri ex rel Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-
00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003);
Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003); Briarcliff, 2004 WL 1418698, at *4.
". See Vickery, supra note 22, at 29.
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These arguments are intensely fact-specific, and courts consider
factors such as the signor's educational and professional background
and the adequacy of the nursing home staff's explanation of the
arbitration clause. Whether plaintiffs prevail depends not only on these
facts, but also on state law and the willingness of courts to overcome
arbitration clauses."12 For example, the Alabama Supreme court is
generally hostile to these arguments, as it is to most claims against
arbitration, while Tennessee courts have uniformly found the
agreements to be unenforceable. Florida courts generally tend to reject
allegations of unconscionabilty.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in two cases, considered
whether the arbitration agreements constituted contracts of adhesion."3
In one case, the court held the arbitration agreement was unenforceable
because the nursing home could not demonstrate that the nursing home
and resident's husband, who signed the agreement, "actually bargained
over the arbitration provision- or that it was a reasonable term
considering the circumstances.""'" The court found the husband did
not have meaningful bargaining power because, as is often the case, he
had to place his wife expeditiously, and the contract, presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, had to be signed as a condition of admission. " '
Additionally, because the husband could not read or write, the nursing
home representative explained the contract to him, but did not explain
that by signing it he was waiving his wife's right to a jury trial." 6
The court also considered the contract itself, and found it should
not be enforced because the arbitration clause was "buried" on the next
to the last page of the contract, was written in the same size font as the
rest of the contract, and did not adequately explain how the arbitration
procedure would work, except as to who would administer it." 
7
Harvey, supra note 70, at 72.
Raitei, 2003 WL 23094413; Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc.,
109 S.W.3d 731. The court defined a contract of adhesion as a "standardized contract
form offered to consumers ... on essentially "a take it or leave it basis," without
affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions
that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or service except by acquiescing
to the form of the contract." Raiteri, 2003 WL 23094413, at *5 (quoting Buraczynski
v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tenn. 1996)).
,,4Howell, 109 S.W.3d 731, 735 quoting Brown v. Karemor Int'l, Inc., 1999 WL
221799 (Tenn. App. April 19, 1999).
115 id.
,,6 Id. (noting that the fact that the husband could not read in itself does not
excuse him from a contract he voluntarily signed).
117 Id
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The other Tennessee case had similar facts and resulted in a
similar outcome.'18 The resident's husband was given a form contract
under very trying circumstances, when he needed to quickly find care
for his ailing wife." 9 The court observed that he had only two options:
to sign the contract as presented and have his wife admitted, or refuse
to sign it and to try to make other arrangements for his wife's care. 20
The husband was distraught over not being able to care for his wife
himself and having to admit her to a nursing home.' 2' His children
testified that he was very agitated, confused and was crying after he
admitted his wife. 2  The court found this to be "a classic case of a
contract of adhesion." 1
23
The Alabama Supreme Court has not been as sympathetic to
plaintiffs alleging unconscionability. To date, the court has not been
persuaded by an unconscionability defense. 4
In Alabama, plaintiffs must demonstrate two factors to prove
unconscionablity: that the terms of the contract were grossly favorable
to one party and that one of the parties had overwhelming bargaining
power.2 2 To satisfy this test, the plaintiffs in one case first contended
the terms were unfair because the arbitration provider specified in the
arbitration agreement, the American Health Lawyers Association
(AHLA), is a "puppet for the health care and long term care
industries.' 26 Second, they argued that the facility had overwhelming
bargaining power because their county only has two nursing homes,
precluding meaningful choice of provider. 127 The court rejected both
arguments for lack of evidence that the AHLA is actually biased and
that nursing home care is unavailable without agreeing to arbitration.1
21
,' Raitei, 2003 WL 23094413, at *8.
119 Id.
1
20 
id.
121 Id at *2.
122 Id
.23 Raitei, 2003 WL 23094413, at *8.
124 See Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, Nos. 101219 :and 1012195,
2004 WL 226087 (Ala. Feb. 6, 2004); Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890
So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004), reb'g denied, Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 2004
Ala. LEXIS 302 (Ala. Apr. 16, 2004);
2'5 Briarcliff Nursing Home v. Turcotte, 2004 WL 1418698, Nos. 1012193,
1012195, at *3 (Ala. June 25, 2004).126 id
27 Id at *4.
128 Id,
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In another case, the court readily rejected a dalighter's assertion
that the contract was unconscionable because she was unaware it
contained an arbitration provision and signed it as her "elderly and ill"
mother was being admitted from the hospital.'29 The court, almost
angrily, characterized her argument as a request for the court to adopt a
per se rule that any arbitration agreement between a nursing home and
elderly resident in poor health is unconscionable.'3
Like the Alabama Supreme Court, Florida courts have not
generally ruled in favor of plaintiffs who raise defenses of
unconscionablity. As in other cases, plaintiffs argued they did not
understand the arbitration provision, that nobody explained they were
giving up their right to a jury trial by signing it, and that the arbitration
agreement was essentially hidden by other paperwork they had to sign
to admit the resident. 3 ' But unlike the Tennessee courts that were
persuaded by similar arguments, Florida courts have rejected these
claims, reasoning that the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to read the
agreements regardless of whether they actually read them.3 2 Further,
one court suggested that if plaintiffs were uncomfortable with the
agreements, they could have had them reviewed by family members or
an attorney.133
However, in one Florida case, the court refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement, finding it unconscionable because of its unfair
terms and because of "some irregularity" surrounding the
circumstances under which it was signed. 34 The court held the terms to
be egregiously unconscionable for violating state remedial law. 3' The
statute at issue, the Florida Nursing Home Resident Resident's Rights
Act, provides for a private cause of action, attorney's fees and punitive
damages for violations of residents' rights.3 6 The arbitration agreement
directly contravened the statute by capping punitive damages and
excluding attorney's fees. Although the agreement included a notice on
the first page warning that it requires waiver of statutory rights, the
court found this notice deficient because it did not inform the resident
29 Owens, 890 So.2d at 988-89.
130 Id. at 989.
" Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003); Consol. Res. Healthcare Fund I, Ltd., v. Fenelus, 853 So. 2d 500, 504
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
.32 Fenelus, 853 So.2d at 504; Gainesville, 857 So. 2d at 281.
' Gainesville, 857 So. 2d at 282.
'34 Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. App.
2003), reh'g denied, Manor Care, Inc. v. Romano, 874 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 2004).
... Id. at 62-63.
116 Id. at 63.
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that she had a statutory right to punitive damages.'37 The court
invalidated the agreement, holding that "[a]lthough parties may agree
to arbitrate statutory claims, even ones involving important social
policies, arbitration must provide the prospective litigant with an
effective way to vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum."'
3
In addition to being substantively unconscionable, the court
found the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement
irregular. 39 The resident's elderly husband was given the admission
documents, including a six-page arbitration agreement, the day after his
wife was admitted. 140 The court noted that he was not informed nor did
the agreement indicate that his wife would not be ousted from the
nursing home for failure to sign. '41 Instead, the administrator simply
told him that he had to sign the documents. 142 The administrator later
admitted that she herself did not understand the arbitration
agreement.' 43  Although the court found only "some quantum of
procedural unconscionability" in the admissions process, the court
explained that the more substantively oppressive the terms, the less
evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to render the
contract unenforceable.' 44 Having found the terms to be egregious, the
court was satisfied that the contract was unenforceable. 145
8. State Statutory and Constitutional Rights
Plaintiffs have also tried to defeat mandatory arbitration agreements by
arguing that they do not comply with state law. These arguments have
taken three forms: Plaintiffs have contended that the agreements are
inconsistent with the state nursing home code, that they violate state
arbitration law, or that they take away their right to a jury trial as
guaranteed by the state constitution. With the exception of the
'37 Id. at 61.
Id. at 62 citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)
(finding that arbitration provides an alternative forum for vindication of statutory
rights).
139 Romano, 861 So. 2d at 62
140 Id. at 61.
141 id.
142 id.
"' Id. If a trained professional charged with managing the daily operations of a
nursing home cannot understand the agreement, it is not clear how residents or
families are expected to understand it, especially during the overwhelming event of
nursing home admission.
'" Romano, 861 So. 2d at 61-62.
145 Id. at 64.
[Vol.8.1:263
MANDA TOR Y ARBITRA TION A GREEMENTS
constitutional claim, plaintiffs have raised these arguments when the
agreements invoke state law rather than the FAA. 146
In addition to arguing that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable because it contravenes the state nursing home code, as
in the Florida case described above, Florida plaintiffs have also relied
on state law directly in asserting that the agreement is unenforceable.
In one case, the arbitration agreement specified that the arbitration
proceeding would be administered by the National Health Lawyers
Association (NHLA) using its rules of procedure. 147  The plaintiff
argued that the agreement should not be enforced because the NHLA's
discovery and evidence rules conflict with the remedies provided in the
state's nursing home code. 48  The court disagreed, reasoning that
common law does not preclude enforcement of contracts that waive
statutory rights and remedies. 149 The court further observed that it
could find no provisions of the nursing home code that explicitly limit
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 50  However, the court
recognized that arbitration agreements that contravene statutory rights
may be unconscionable and thus remanded the case on this point. '5
In another Florida case, the trial court denied the facility's
motion to compel arbitration, holding that the plaintiffs claim did not
arise from the arbitration agreement at all, but was instead predicated
on the nursing home code as indicated in the complaint.'5 2 The trial
court found the resident's injury resulted from a breach of duties
imposed by the state nursing home code, and thus determined that his
claim was "wholly independent" of the admissions agreement. 
53
However, the appellate court reversed, finding the resident's claim
arose directly from the agreement because his admission to the facility
triggered the facility's statutory duties.'T 4 Moreover, the court noted
that other statutory claims are regularly subject to arbitration in Florida,
and thus it would not invalidate the agreement because of its statutory
claim.'55 Although the plaintiff did not rely on unconscionability as a
'" See Conversation, supra note 41 (suggesting that referencing state law is a
precaution in the event that state courts determine the FAA is not controlling).
,4' Richmond Healthcare, Inc. v. Digati, 878 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
148 id
149 Id. at 390.
"o Id. at 391.
', Id. at 392.
152 See Five Points Health Care, Ltd. v. Alberts, 867 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004).
153 Id.
'14 Id. at 521.
155 Id. at 522.
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defense, the court further stated, "...the agreement here would not be
found substantively unconscionable merely because it requires
arbitration of a statutory claim."156 It is unclear from the case, however,
whether the terms of the agreement limited remedies afforded by the
statute, such as attorney's fees and damages, as in the Florida case
described earlier.
157
Another way that a plaintiff sought to invalidate a mandatory
arbitration clause was by relying on the state arbitration law. A
California plaintiff challenged the arbitration agreement she had signed
because it was contained on page nine of the contract, rather than being
the first article as required, and because it did not use the language
prescribed by the California arbitration statute.5 8 The court found her
arguments without merit, pointing out that the agreement was a
separate one-page document that was referenced at page nine, and that
its divergence from the statutory language was merely stylistic. 59 Even
though the plaintiff did not prevail on these particular facts, this case
illustrates that other plaintiffs might have success in circumventing
arbitration if the agreement they signed does not comply with
requirements provided by state arbitration laws. On the other hand, this
offers little recourse to plaintiffs as it is unlikely that agreements will
not comply with the state law that they specifically invoke.
An Indiana case illustrates another argument that relies on state
law to avoid arbitration. In the case, the estate of the resident
maintained the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it
unconstitutionally deprived it of a jury trial.' 6° The plaintiff-estate
relied on the Indiana constitution, which provides, "In all civil cases,
the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.''. Despite this
constitutional guarantee, the court held the resident's estate was bound
by the arbitration agreement signed by the resident's daughter.' 62 In so
holding, the court noted that under Indiana law constitutional rights
may be waived and that the daughter's waiver was knowing and
voluntary, even though she was rushed and distracted when admitting
156 Id.
,17 See Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 63 (Fla. App.
2003), reh'g denied, Manor Care, Inc. v. Romano, 874 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 2004).
158 Flaum v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., No. B157317, 2002 WL 31852905
at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec 20, 2002).
159 Id.
'60 Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., L.L.C., 813 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004).
161 id.
162 id
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her mother to the facility.' 63  Her mother was yelling and behaving
aggressively and her children, whom she had with her, needed her
attention. ,64
9. Medicare and Medicaid Statutes
Advocates for nursing home residents contend that the Medicare and
Medicaid statutes preclude arbitration agreements in nursing homes
that are certified by Medicare and/or Medicaid. 165 Medicare-certified
facilities must accept Medicare, including co-payments and
deductibles, as payment in full.' 66  Similarly, Medicaid-certified
facilities must abide by regulations that prohibit them from charging,
soliciting, accepting, or receiving "in addition to any amount otherwise
required to be paid under the [Medicaid Program], any gift, money,
donation, or other consideration" as a precondition of admission,
expedited admission or continued stay in the facility.' 67 Advocates urge
that asking residents to sign an arbitration agreement and waive their
right to a jury trial constitutes additional consideration in violation of
the Medicare and Medicaid statutes.' 6' Because 75% of nursing home
residents are covered by Medicare and/or Medicaid, 69 this argument
has potential to be a broadly sweeping method to curtail the increasing
use of mandatory arbitration agreements in the nursing home industry.
Thus far, however, courts have not been persuaded that an arbitration
agreement constitutes additional consideration. 70
163 Id.
'6, Id. The court additionally looked to a state trial rule in support of its holding.
The rule provides that nothing in the trial rules shall deny parties the right to agree to
submit their dispute to arbitration or to deny the courts power to enforce arbitration
agreements. The court construed the rule as evidence of a 'a very strong presumption
of enforceability of contracts that represent the freely bargained agreement of the
parties.'" Sanford, 813 N.E.2d at 420 quotingRansburg v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393,
395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
'65 See NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, MANDATORY ARBITRATION
FORBIDDEN FOR NURSING FACILITY RESIDENTS REIMBURSED THROUGH MEDICARE OR
MEDICAID (2003), athttp://www.nsclc.org/news/03/10/nfarbitrationcarlson.htm.
'6642 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(iii) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 489.30 (2004).
16742 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(3) (2004)
'6' See NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 165.
'69 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, THE NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY: THE
1999 SUMMARY (2002), at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_1 3/sri 3_152.pdf.
"0 See Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 288 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 989 (Ala.
2004), reh'g denied, Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 2004 Ala. LEXIS 302
(Ala. Apr. 16, 2004); Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., L.L.C., 813 N.E.2d 411,
418-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); But see Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, 109
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A Florida court expressed that it did not believe that the
Medicaid provision prohibiting additional consideration was intended
to apply to arbitration agreements. 7 ' The Alabama Supreme Court
similarly refused to invalidate an arbitration agreement, reasoning that
it merely sets an alternative forum for dispute resolution and binds both
parties, who both receive the benefits and detriments of arbitration. 1
2
The court worried that if it agreed with the plaintiff, any contract term
she did not like could be construed as requiring additional
consideration for admission into the nursing home.1
73
The Court of Appeals of Indiana came to the same conclusion
as the Florida and Alabama courts, but only after engaging in an
exercise of statutory construction. 74 The court analyzed the words,
"gift, money, donation, or other consideration," in the Medicaid
statute.175 Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis --which holds that
when a general phrase follows specific terms, the general phrase will be
interpreted to include only things in the same class as the specific
terms-- the court determined that "other consideration" cannot include
an arbitration agreement.176 It reasoned that "requiring a [resident] to
sign an arbitration agreement is not akin to charging an additional fee
or other consideration as a prerequisite of admission."
177
Interestingly, in a footnote, the court warned that by entering
arbitration agreements nursing homes may forgo protections afforded
by the state's Medical Malpractice Act, which limits the provider's
liability and requires review of claims by a medical panel.78
C. Related Developments
1. Nursing Home Regulators
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) administers
the federal programs that reimburse nursing homes for care of residents
who are Medicare and/or Medicaid recipients. 79  Because so few
residents can afford to pay privately for nursing home care, most
S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003 (pretermitting consideration of this argument,
but noting that it has some appeal).
"' Gainesville, 857 So. 2d at 288.
172 Owens, 890 So. 2d at 989.
173 Id.
"' Sanford, 813 N.E.2d at 419.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
17 Id. at 419.
179 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ABOUT THE CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (CMS), at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/about/.
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nursing homes are dependent on these federal funds.'8 ° As a condition
of participation in the programs, nursing homes must comply with the
Federal Nursing Home Care Act and similar state statutes. 8 '
In response to the increasing use of arbitration agreements by
nursing homes, CMS issued a brief memorandum to state surveyor
agencies, which monitor nursing home compliance with federal and
state laws, offering guidance on how they should respond to binding
arbitration in nursing homes.' The memo, characterized as evasive
and equivocating by some, does not take a firm position.' It states:
Under Medicare, whether to have a binding arbitration agreement is
an issue to be decided between the resident and the nursing home.
Under Medicaid, we will defer to State law as to whether or not
such binding arbitration agreements are permitted subject to the
concerns we have where Federal regulations may be implicated.
Under both programs, however, there may be consequences for the
facility where facilities attempt to enforce these agreements in a
way that violates Federal requirements. 4
The memo notes that a facility may subject itself to an
enforcement action if it retaliates against or discharges residents for
refusing to sign an arbitration agreement, actions that clearly violate theo • 185
regulations. The memo essentially maintains the status quo; it
affirms that surveyors will cite facilities that violate regulations, but
will not cite them for using arbitration agreements, leaving the question
of whether mandatory arbitration agreements are permissible to be
determined on a case-by-case basis by the courts.
In contrast to the neutral position taken by CMS, The Arkansas
Department of Human Services, charged with enforcing federal and
state nursing home regulations in the state, took a strong stance against
an arbitration agreement used by Northport Health Services, a chain of
80 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 169, at 4.
See42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i(3)(d)(4)(A) (2004).
182 Memorandum from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, to the
Survey and Certification Group Regional Office Management (G-5) State Survey
Agency Directors
(Jan. 9, 2003), at http://www.nsclc.org/news/03/02/s&cO103.htm [hereinafter
CMS Memorandum].
' See ELDER LAW ANSWERS, CMS EQUIVOCATES ON BINDING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS (2003), at http://www.elderlawanswers.com; NATIONAL SENIOR
CITIZENS LAW CENTER, CMS PASSES ON BINDING ARBITRATION ISSUE (2003), at
http://www.nsclc.org/news/03/02/cmsbindingarb.htm.
,8 CMS Memorandum, supra note 182, at 1.85 Id. at 2.
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nursing homes in Arkansas.16  In a declaratory order issued in July
2002, the Department found Northport's arbitration agreement to be
"distinctly one-sided," evidencing "a gross inequality of bargaining
power" to the disadvantage of residents. "' In considering the
provision of the Medicaid statute that prohibits additional consideration
as a condition of admission, it stated plainly, "[residents] gain nothing
-except admission to the [nursing home]-in return for forfeiting their
resident rights."'88  Yet in return for residents' waiver of rights, the
nursing homes do not accept lower Medicaid payments. 8 9
The declaratory order also questions the arbitration agreement's
invocation of the FAA and its declaration that Northport nursing homes
regularly engage in interstate commerce.' 9° As the FAA preempts state
law, this provision is designed to circumvent the state's arbitration
statute, which prohibits arbitration of personal injury and tort claims.'9'
But the Department expressed skepticism that the operations of a
nursing home actually involve interstate commerce, a requirement for
application of the FAA. 92 It noted that the purpose of the nursing
homes was to serve the local population, and that "[e]ach Agreement is
executed between an Arkansas resident and an Arkansas [nursing
home] for care to be delivered in Arkansas by Arkansans."' 93
Accordingly, the Department concluded that the arbitration agreements
are subject to the state law and thus inapplicable to tort and personal
186 Declaratory Order In the Matter of Northport Health Servs., 14 (2002),
www.nsclc.org/news/03/03/northportdecorderl .pdf.
187 Id. at 3-4. As summarized by the Department, the agreement specifies that:
"(1) Northport is bound only as to disputes with the resident; however, the
resident and the resident's representatives are bound in disputes with Northport,
Northport's parent or subsidiary companies, facility officers, directors, managers,
employers, agents, and any other person. Furthermore, § 16 F. of the Agreement goes
on to expressly bind family members, advocates, and ombudsmen.
(3) All disputes of $25,000 or more must be resolved by binding arbitration;
(4) The arbitrator has exclusive authority to decide if the Agreement is valid;
(5) Alabama law governs the arbitration procedures, and the Alabama Medical
Liability Act limits the facility's exposure to damages;
(6) The right to a jury trial is waived;
(7) The parties acknowledge that Northport regularly engages in transactions
involving interstate commerce, that the services provided by Northport involve
interstate commerce, and that the Federal Arbitration Act governs all arbitrations." Id.
188 Id. at 4.
89 Id. at 5.
I' Id. at 12.
"'1 Northport Health Servs., supra note 186, at 12.
192 id
193 Id. at 13.
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injury claims.' 94 In effect, then, the Department invalidated their use in
nursing homes. However, as the Department issued the order prior to
the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of interstate commerce in
Alafabco, it is unlikely that a court would find that the FAA does not
preempt the Arkansas statute.'95 Even if a court were to so rule, the
Department observed that the FAA would not bar the Department from
terminating state Medicaid contracts with Northport and other nursing
homes who include unlawful terms in their arbitration agreements. 96
2. Arbitration Providers
The American Health Lawyers Association, commonly referenced in
nursing home arbitration agreements, and the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the nation's largest arbitration provider, have both
recently implemented policies whereby they will no longer administer
consumer health care liability claims unless the agreement to arbitrate
was entered into by the parties after the alleged injury occurred. 197 A
senior vice president of the AAA succinctly explained the reasoning
behind the new policy: "It's not fair to ask a person who's going in for
medical treatment to sign an arbitration agreement...we're talking
about things that affect your life and your health." 98
While the new policies of the AAA and the AHLA may not
have much impact on the use of arbitration agreement by nursing
homes -since there are several other providers to choose from-- they
are nevertheless significant because they demonstrate that even
providers of arbitration recognize pre-dispute arbitration agreements as
inherently unfair to healthcare consumers.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ARBITRATION
Mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are widely viewed as
unfair to consumers.'99 Yet they are even more unfair to nursing home
194 Id.
195 See supra text accompanying notes 65 & 77.
' Northport Health Servs., supra note 186, at 14.
97 See AM. ARB. Ass'N, AAA ANNOUNCES CHANGE IN HEALTH CARE POLICY, at
http://www.adr.org/index2. ljsp?JSPssid= 15780&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\About\w
hatsnew\Health%2oCare%2OPolicy.htm (last visited June 13, 2002); AM. HEALTH
LAW. ASS'N, IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT RELATED TG HEALTH LAWYERS' ADR
SERVICE (2003), athttp://www.healthlawyers.org/adr/announcement.cfm.
,9 Joelle Babula, Valley Health Care: Group won't arbitrate medical cases, LAS
VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at 1-B.
199 See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 4; Your Money. The Arbitration
trap: How consumers pay for 'low-cost' justice, 64 CONSUMER REPS. 64 (1999);
Winninghoff supra note 7.
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residents. The agreements are typically presented on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis during the stressful admissions process, when residents and
their families are more focused on coping with the usually unwelcome
event of a move to a nursing home.2°  Unlike consumer arbitration
agreements that preclude litigation of contract claims, arbitration
agreements in nursing homes deny vulnerable individuals who have
been neglected or abused by their caregivers the opportunity to raise
tort claims in court. Many states have recognized that mandating
arbitration in any tort or personal injury cases, and specifically in cases
of nursing home or elder abuse, is contrary to the public interest and
have enacted laws to bar arbitration in these cases.2 °' Arbitration
agreements especially do not belong in contracts between residents and
nursing homes because they permit nursing homes, which are largely
publicly funded, to circumvent public policy by attempting to keep
instances of substandard care from the public view.
Arguments regularly advanced in favor of arbitration posit that
arbitration is less expensive than litigation, provides faster resolution, is
administered by a neutral decision maker knowledgeable in the field
subject to the dispute, protects confidentiality, and is a less formal and
less adversarial process that maintains on-going relationships.202 Yet
these benefits, if applicable at all in the nursing home context,
primarily favor health care providers while limiting the due process of
consumers who waive their right to a jury trial and the opportunity to
appeal an adverse decision.
A. Costs
Cost savings of arbitration are regularly touted as one of the advantages
of arbitration. 23 However, not only is there an absence of evidence to
support this conclusion, 24 any perceived cost savings ultimately benefit
200 See Raiteri ex relCox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-
COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 23094413, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003).
20' See, e.g., ARK CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (2001) (exempting personal injury
and tort matters from enforcement of arbitration agreements); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-
401(c)(3) (1991) (exempting tort claims); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(a) (1995)
(exempting personal injury claims); See infra note 270 for statutes that protect the
right of nursing home residents to commence an action in court.
202 See Rolph, supra note 15, at 155; Thomas B. Metzloff, Business Law
Symposium, Commercial Arbitration: A Discussion of Recent Developments and
Trends, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 203,208 (1996).
'o' Russel Myles and Kelly Reese, Arbitration: A voiding the Runaway Jury, 23
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 129, 137-38 (1999).
204 THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 51 (contending that the National
Arbitration Forum's claim that "[a]rbitration can save parties 70-80% of the cost of
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corporations rather than consumers. Arbitration has been found to be
more expensive for consumers than litigation, and its often-prohibitive
fees, or forum costs, may serve to bar consumers from pursuing claims
at all.206 Even though some arbitration providers have recently adopted
consumer-friendly measures, defendants still benefit from arbitration
because awards issued by arbitrators tend to be lower than jury
awards .27
The forum costs of arbitration are generally determined by the
filing and administrative fees charged by the arbitration provider and
by the arbitrator's hourly or daily rate. 208 Fees vary depending on the
arbitration provider, the nature of the case, and the amount of the
209claim. In some cases, the filing fee may be as high as $2,000,10 and
arbitrators may charge as much as $600 per hour of their time.21 One
arbitration provider charges additional fees for subpoenas, motions,
discovery requests and written findings, which otherwise are not
produced.'12 Generally, arbitration rules provide that some of these
forum costs will be divided evenly between the parties, and may be
allocated to one party in the award at the discretion of the arbitrator.
213
Nevertheless, even when arbitration rules contain fee-splitting
214provisions, arbitration may remain cost prohibitive for consumers.
litigating [employment discrimination] cases" is false; See also Rolph, supra note 15,
at 156-57; Marcus Nieto & Margaret Hosel, Arbitration in California Managed Health
Care Systems, CAL. RES. BUREAU, Dec. 2000, at 24.
205 Myles, supra note 203, at 137-38 (citing a Cornell University survey of ADR
use among 1,000 of the nation's largest corporations, which found that saving money
is an important reason why they use arbitration).
206 THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 52. California's independent
auditor also suggests that the cost of pursuing arbitration may prevent consumers
from filing claims. Nieto, supra note 204, at 25.
201 See Bloom, supra note 34, at 76.
20' Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration In Consumer
Contracts: A Call ForReform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1250 (2001).
209 THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 42 (finding that forum costs
range from $700 to nearly $8,000 depending on the amount of the claim).
2 0 See Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 603 (2002).
2,, See Margaret Jacobs, Retired Judges Seize Rising Role in Settling Disputes in
California, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1996, at Al.
2,2 THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 43.
.3 See AM. HEALTH LAW. ASS'N ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERV.,
CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS (2003), available at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/adr/adr-manual arb-rev0312.pdf.
2' See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores Inc. and Shankle v. Pep Boys, 317 F.3d
646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (consolidated for en banc review) (holding that if a cost-
splitting provision would still deter a substantial number of litigants, the court should
refuse to enforce the provision).
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Courts have been responsive to arguments that arbitration
clauses are not enforceable because the costs of arbitration deter
consumers from bringing their claims.25 This argument is sometimes
referred to as the "prohibitive cost defense. ' '216  The defense has
emerged following the Supreme Court's recognition that "the existence
of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant.., from effectively
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. 217 It is not
clear, however, whether this defense extends to claims that do not
assert federal statutory rights."' Thus, the availability of this defense to
nursing home residents and their families, who more often rely on state
tort law, is unknown and thus far untested. Although courts in Florida
have rejected statutory claims as a means to defeat nursing home
motions to compel arbitration,2 9 plaintiffs might prevail using this
defense in other states that afford statutory remedies against nursing
homes.220  Even if courts continue to view that arbitration merely
provides another forum for resolution of statutory claims,22' plaintiffs
can demonstrate that the cost of arbitration precludes them from
bringing a claim in any forum. Additionally, courts may choose to
extend the prohibitive cost defense to common law claims.2
In addition to courts, some arbitration providers have also
recognized that arbitration costs can present a bar to consumer claims,
215 See Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 603-04 (2002)
(discussing cases that held arbitration clauses unenforceable because of the
prohibitive costs of arbitration for consumers, and similarly ruling in favor of
consumer); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (finding the
plaintiffs argument too speculative, but noting that plaintiffs can assert the
prohibitive cost argument if they develop a factual record to support it).216 Mendez, 45 P.3d at 603.
217 Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. at 90.
218 One commentator notes that the opinion in Green Tree Fin., can be read in
three ways. First, it could be limited to claims raised under the Truth in Lending Act,
the statute at issue in the case. Second, it could be read broadly to include all or most
federal statutory claims. Third, it could be "misconstrued" as a federal common law
of unconscionability that arguably preempts relevant state law. See David S.
Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stipping Arbitration Clauses: Validity,
Arbitrability, and Preclusion tri"ncioles, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 49, 84 (2003).
29 See Richmond Healthcare, Inc. v. Digati, 878 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); See Five Points Health Care, Ltd. v. Alberts, 867 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
220 See infra note 270.
221 See, e.g. Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 987-88
(Ala. 2004), reh'g denied, Apr. 16, 2004.
222 See, e.g., Murphy v. Mid-West Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Tenn., 78 P.3d 766
(Idaho 2003) (holding that the prohibitive costs of arbitration rendered arbitration
clause unenforceable in a claim for insurance benefits).
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leading them to establish special consumer rates.223 For example,
JAMS, a major arbitration provider, has adopted minimum standards of
fairness designed to afford consumers protections against business
entities that employ mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration clauses.2
Under one provision of its new rules consumers will incur fees
"approximately equivalent" to court filing fees.225 Yet the American
Arbitration Association, another arbitration provider that offers
consumer rates, leaves the decision about whether to apply the capped
fees to its own discretion.226
The steps taken by arbitration providers to lower consumer
costs recognize that non-discounted arbitration fees are unfair to
consumers. And while they might remove some obstacles for
consumers whose cases are heard by these providers, the purported
cost-savings of arbitration nevertheless often remain illusory for other
consumers who are not offered reduced rates. Any cost savings
associated with faster resolution in arbitration do not affect the high
forum costs that deter consumers from raising their claims in the first
place. Moreover, even when the forum costs do not bar consumer
claims, defendants benefit because damages awarded to consumers by
223 Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A
Critique of Public Citizen' Jeremiad on the "Costs of Arbitration, " 57 DisP. RESOL.
J. 8, 11-12 (2003); The AAA has since instituted procedures for consumer-related
disputes that limit the arbitrator's fees for consumers to $375 for claims over $10,000
and lower than $75,000. However, if the claim exceeds $75,000 consumers must pay
an "Administrative Fee" based on the AAA's commercial fee schedule, and must also
pay the arbitrator's fees as individually determined by the arbitrator. See AM. ARB.
ASS'N., SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES (2003),
at http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures; Moreover, whether to apply the consumer
rules is up to the discretion of the arbitrator. AM. ARB. ASS'N., COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2003), at
http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures. In addition to caps on fees voluntarily
established by arbitration providers, state statutes may provide that consumers with
limited resources are entitled to a waiver of arbitration fees and costs. For example, a
California statute provides that consumers with a gross monthly income of less than
300% of the federal poverty guidelines are entitled to a waiver of arbitration fees and
costs. However, this waiver does not apply to arbitrator fees, which may comprise the
bulk of the forum costs, so it is unclear how much protection California's statute
offers consumers. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1284.3(b)1 (2004).
224 See JUDICIAL ARB. & MEDIATION SERV., JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER
ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES - MINIMUM STANDARDS OF
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2005), at
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/consumerminstd.asp.
225 Id.
226 AM. ARB. ASS'N., supra note 223, at section R-7.
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arbitrators tend to be lower than awards in litigation.227 Indeed, lower
awards and avoiding juries angered by nursing home neglect have been
cited by representatives of the nursing home industry as incentive to
impose arbitration on residents.2 ' Defense attorneys realize that they
are much more likely to come out ahead in arbitration, even if, as they
claim, they lose more often in arbitration because the arbitrators are
more conservative than juries in awarding damages.229
Smaller awards not only benefit defendants directly, but may
also work to deter plaintiffs attorneys from representing claimants in
arbitration, further insulating defendants from liability. Plaintiffs
attorneys have acknowledged that they are reluctant to take on medical
malpractice arbitration cases when potential monetary awards are
limited. 23 In fact, a much larger percentage of patients went through
arbitration without legal representation against a large managed health
plan in California than in medical malpractice claims raised in court -
nearly 25 % did not have legal counsel in arbitration compared to 1% to
23114% who litigated their claims in court. Other sources report that most
attorneys would not accept a case worth less than $20,000;232 that
attorneys who regularly handle employment discrimination cases on
average require provable damages of $60,000 to $65,000.233
Paradoxically, proponents of arbitration cite these figures in support of
arbitration.3 They assert that without arbitration many individuals
227 Bloom, supra note 34, at 76. "If an attorney has an employer-employee
dispute, a personal injury dispute, or a medical malpractice dispute, and he or she is
representing the defense, this attorney will almost always want to be in arbitration.
The reason for this is that although you are statistically much more likely to loose in
arbitration as opposed to a court trial, you are also much more likely to come out
ahead in terms of total dollars invested; that is, the plaintiffs recovery in arbitration of
any of the above types of disputes, is going to be so small compared to the likely
recovery in court if the plaintiff wins, that the defense attorney will almost always be
better off in arbitration." Id
228 Conversation, supra note 41.
229 Bloom, supra note 34, at 76.
230 Daniel Costello, After reform, Kaiser still in spotlight; Other insurers move
to ward the company's arbitration model even as critics says its changes haven 't gone
far enough, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at Fl.
231 Id
232 Keith Maurer, Enforcing Consumers' adEmployees'Legal lRghts, The Truth
About Arbitration, 82 MICH. B.J. 20, 21 (2003) (citing Jill S. Chanen, Pumping Up
Small Claims, A.B.A.J. 18 (1998).
211 See AM. ARB. ASs'N, FAIR PLAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION (2003),
at http://www.adr.org (on file with author).
231 See Maurer, supra note 232 (the author works for the National Arbitration
Forum, one of the major arbitration providers).
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would have no "access to justice.' '21 However, they fail to
acknowledge that smaller awards in arbitration make it even harder to
find attorneys, and that claimants still need legal representation in
arbitration.
Rather than representing cost savings then, arbitration is usually
not only more expensive than litigation for consumers, but may be so
expensive that it effectively bars consumers from seeking redress for
their injuries, a deterrent acknowledged by the Supreme Court. 237 Even
though arbitration is generally faster than litigation and thus lowersr" 238
certain costs such as attorney's fees, the expense may nevertheless be
prohibitive for consumers, thereby precluding any redress at all, given
that they have waived the right to bring their claims in court. For
defendants, conversely, the cost savings and lower awards of arbitration
represent a definite incentive to arbitrate.
B. Expert Arbitrators
In addition to its purported cost-savings, proponents of arbitration
argue that arbitration is superior to litigation because parties have the
benefit of having their dispute heard by objective experts,
knowledgeable about the subject area of the dispute, and prone to
render fair judgments in emotionally charged, heart rending cases,
which would otherwise be heard in the "theatrical forum" of the
_ 240
courtroom.240 This asserted benefit appears to be no more than a
reference to the smaller awards that arbitrators tend to issue. 4' The
nursing home industry readily admits that the main reason it imposes
arbitration is to avoid high jury awards.2
235 FAIR PLAY, supra note 233, at 4.
236 Costello, supra note 230 (the article reports that 70% of cases that were
summarily dismissed in arbitration involving Kaiser Permanente, a managed health
plan, were pro se cases. The article also quotes a paralegal, who was overwhelmed
when representing himself in arbitration because he couldn't find an attorney to
represent him initially, "I have a graduate degree and 20 years of legal experience. If I
have a problem with this, imagine how bad it is for other people").
237 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
238 Myles, supra note 203, at 138.
239 Bloom, supra note 34, at 76.
240 Robert Kotler, Arbitrate More, Give in to Greed Less, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13,
2003, at A19 (stating, "arbitration provides a less theatrical forum than the
courtroom," and "... arbitrators are, by education and experienLe, better equipped to
dispassionately analyze the often complex scientific and technical issues"); Rolph,
supra note 15, at 155.
241 See Bloom, supra note 34, at 76.
242 See Conversation, supra note 41.
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While arbitrators may favor limited awards, this does not
necessarily mean that their judgments are more accurate because they
are experts in the subject of the arbitration. Instead, critics note that
arbitrators favor lower awards, or exhibit bias toward the business
entity, because of the repeat-player advantage .2 " This advantage stems
from the more frequent appearances by the business or institutional
entity, placing it in a position to develop a relationship with the
arbitrator.244 Additionally, because the arbitration provider is typically
selected by the institutional entity, arbitrators depend on it for future
business.245 To protect this beneficial relationship, their incentive is to
favor the business entity in their decisions 2 46 A report by California's
independent auditor about arbitration in managed health care systems
found that of the few arbitrators who awarded patients over $1 million,
241none was selected to arbitrate a second case.
Moreover, the consumer group Public Citizen makes the point
that determinations of negligence do not require special expertise, but
rather are subject to the "reasonable person" standard, typically the
province of jurors.248 One commentator asks, "How many truck drivers,
postal workers, housewives, or other working men and women are
certified arbitrators," suggesting that consumers fare worse in
arbitration than in litigation.249
Thus, the claim that arbitrators are objective experts
uninfluenced by emotional pitfalls that so plague juries appears to be
code for the lower damage awards commonly handed out by arbitrators.
Like cost savings, this asserted advantage of arbitration benefits the
institutional party rather than the consumer.
C. Informal Process
A professed benefit of health care arbitration is that it represents an
informal process that is less adversarial than litigation and therefore
243 Rolph, supra note 15, at 156.
244 Id.
245 id
246d
247 Nieto, supra note 204, at 2. The auditors also found that 30% of Kaiser
Permanente's arbitration claims were handled by eight repeat arbitrators and that six
of these eight arbitrators ruled in favor of the defense in four-fifths of the cases.
However, the report also notes that overall, plaintiffs had a 26% chance of winning
with a repeat arbitrator, compared to 30% chance of winning with a non-repeat
arbitrator. Id. at 22.
248 THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at 60.
249 David G. Wirtes, Suggestions For Defeating Arbitration, 24 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 111, 115 (2000).
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protects on-going relationships. Although the resident-provider
relationship is central to the quality of the resident's nursing home
experience, it is questionable whether maintaining relationships is
relevant once the resident or her family has decided to bring a claim
against the nursing home, particularly when families so often sue for
wrongful death. As one industry attorney notes, by the time residents
file lawsuits, they are "pissed."25' It is doubtful that arbitration can
salvage an already broken relationship, especially when plaintiffs'
anger may be compounded by learning for the first time that they
signed an arbitration agreement once they try to file suit. Additionally,
arbitration is not much less adversarial than litigation since lawyers
often represent parties to the arbitration.252
Advocates of arbitration are correct, however, when they say
that arbitration is less formal than litigation. Yet, by informality they
mean limited discovery and optional adherence to the law and legal
precedent - factors that primarily favor defendants. 253 Limiting
discovery benefits defendants because the information plaintiffs need to
2-4prove their case is mainly in the defendant's possession. "
In addition, arbitrators are not bound by rules of evidence, civil
procedure, or professional conduct.2"  Thus, hearings are less
predictable for claimants, whereas the repeat-players are more likely to
know what to expect from arbitrators and thus gain a strategic
advantage.256 Although flexible interpretation of the rules of evidence
might benefit plaintiffs because they may succeed in getting more
evidence admitted than in court, the limited scope of discovery
counteracts this benefit.257 Additionally, some arbitrators limit the
number of witnesses who testify, a practice that also makes it harder for
plaintiffs to prove their cases. 258 Rules governing proceedings in court
are designed to strike an adversarial balance between the parties in the
250 Rolph, supra note 15, at 155.
' Conversation, supra note 41; See Larry Reibstein & Ana Figueroa, Nursing-
Home Verdicts: There's Guilt All Round, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1998, at 34.
252 Myles, supra note 203, at 131.
253 Wirtes, supra note 249, at 114-16.
25 Your Money. The Arbitration trap: How consumers pay for 'low-cost'justice,
64 CONSUMER REPS. 64 (1999).255 
Id.
256 id.
25 Myles, supra note 203, at 135-36, 139-40 (noting that plaintiffs benefit from
the lack of strict evidentiary rules and that limited discovery benefits corporate
defendants).25 Conversation, supra note 41.
2004]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
interest of fairness, whereas arbitrators are not obligated to conform to
this underlying public policy.
259
D. Arbitration Agreements in the Nursing Home Context Are
Against Public Interest
1. Privacy
Arbitration is conducted in a forum closed to the public and produces
no public record of the proceeding. In contrast, when cases are filed
in court, the media has access to and regularly reports on cases of
public interest.2 61 While conceivably some nursing home plaintiffs
might prefer to keep their personal tragedies out of public view, the
secrecy of arbitration disempowers consumers and benefits defendants,
particularly health care providers, who prefer to keep allegations andacconts f nglignce .162
accounts of negligence private. The nursing home industry is
especially sensitive to negative publicity, as it is frequently the subject
of exposes and government reports that highlight egregiously poor care
and other serious shortcomings.263
The secrecy of arbitration is detrimental to members of the
public because they will not be able to learn from others' experiences
to become informed and empowered consumers.2 64  The lack of
information also mitigates the opportunity of the public to use
information brought out in lawsuits in efforts to push for change in
public policy. Similarly, as politicians and government agencies are
often moved to act only after a scandal is reported in the media and
engenders public outrage, the privacy offered by arbitration works
against development of consumer protection policies.
These considerations are especially relevant with regard to
nursing homes. Nursing homes are largely publicly funded by our tax
dollars through the Medicare and Medicaid programs and should not be
permitted to use arbitration in efforts to curb public scrutiny. While
259 David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliff, Civil Procedure By Contract.: A Convoluted
Confluence of Contract and Public Procedure In Need of Congressional Control, 35
U. RiCH. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2002).2 o Myles, supra note 203, at 141.
26, Id. at 140-41.
262 Rolph, supra note 15, at 155.
263 See e.g., The Nursing-Home Scandal, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3, 1975, at 23; Mark
Thompson, Fatal Neglect; In possibly thousands of cases, nursing-home residents are
dying from a lack of food and water and the most basic level of hygiene, TIME, Oct.
27, 1997, at 34; Eric Bates, The Shame of Our Nursing Homes, 268 THE NATION 11
(1999)' Christopher H. Schmitt, The New Math of Old Age; Why the nursing home
industry's cries ofpoverty don't add up, 133 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 67 (2002).
264 Sternlight, supra note 1, at 695.
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limited information about violations of minimum standards is
accessible to the public in annual inspection reports, the reality is that
based on their track record, nursing homes need more checks and
balances, not fewer.
2. Public Policy and Statutory Rights
Although nursing homes are governed by the standards and
resident protections of the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA)65 and
similar state statutes, and are subject to federal and state enforcement
mechanisms, it is widely recognized that government oversight of
nursing homes is inadequate. 266  Having litigation as an alternative
avenue to compel nursing homes to comply with standards of good care
and with regulations protective of resident rights is consistent with
public policy.
Although the NHRA itself does not grant a private right of
action to nursing home residents, it explicitly states that any state or
federal administrative remedies "shall not be construed as limiting such
other remedies, including any remedy available to an individual at
common law. ' ' 68  In passing the NHRA, Congress recognized the
benefit of private action, and noted that the Act was not meant "to limit
remedies available to residents at common law, including private rights
of action to enforce compliance with requirements for nursing
26 Pub. Law No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3,
1396r).
266 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE
PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT (1998), available at
http:www.gao.gov; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: COMPLAINT
INVESTIGATION PROCESSES OFTEN INADEQUATE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES:
ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY
STANDARDS (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, NURSING HOME QUALITY: PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS, WHILE
DECLINIING, REINFORCES IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCED OVERSIGHT (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: PREVALENCE
OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAINS UNACCEPTABLY HIGH, DESPITE SOME DECLINE
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING
HOMES: MORE CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS FROM ABUSE (2002), available
at http://www.gao.gov; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: MANY
SHORTCOMINGS EXIST IN EFFORTS TO PROTECT RESIDENTS FROM ABUSE (2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov.
267 See Brogdon ex rel. Cline v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 103 F.Supp.2d 1322,
1330 (N.D.Ga. 2000); Tinder v. Lewis County Nursing Home Dist., 207 F.Supp.2d
951, 957 (E.D. Mo. 2001).26'42 U.S.C. § 1396r(h)(8) (Supp. V. 1993).
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facilities. ' 69 Several state statutes recognize private rights of actions
for violation of residents' rights and elder abuse statutes.27° These laws
reflect the public policy that nursing home residents warrant protection
in addition to that offered by government oversight. For instance, in
enacting Illinois Nursing Home Act, a member of the General
Assembly observed that residents and their families have a role to play
in guarding against substandard care and abuse because they are in a
better position than the regulatory agency to know of and seek redress
for abuses."' To provide an incentive for residents to bring claims, the
General Assembly provided that the nursing home shall pay costs and
attorney's fees to residents whose rights they have violated.2 Further
recognizing the importance of litigation, some states have amended
their nursing home codes to protect residents' right to a jury trial. The
laws provide that waiver of the private cause of action and of the right
to a jury trial shall be null and void. 73 In light of the public policy that
encourages private action in addition to regulatory oversight, nursing
homes that accept government funding should remain accountable in
public courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Admission to a nursing home is typically an unexpected, unwelcome
and overwhelming event in a family's life. Not only are residents and
their families faced with an emotionally challenging situation, but they
must also attend to the admissions process. It is unfair to bind them to
arbitration agreements that they inadvertently enter upon admission,
when they have little opportunity to carefully examine all of the
documents they are given and asked to sign. Arbitration, moreover, is
generally a forum unfavorable to consumers because of prohibitive
costs, procedural limitations and the fact that business entities can draft
2169 H.R. REP. No. 100-391(I), at 472 (1987).
270 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West 2005); CONN., GEN. STAT. ANN.
§19a-550(e) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §400.023 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN.
§31-8-126(a) (West 2005); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3-601 (West 2005); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. Ch. 111 § 70E (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS §333.21772 (West
2005); Mo. REv. STAT. § 198.093 (West 2005); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151:30 (West
2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:13-8 (West 2005); OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 3721.17(1)
(West 2005); OKL. ST. ANN. §1-939 (West 2005); W.VA. CODE §16-5C-15 (West
2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. §50.10, 50.11 (West 2005).
27 Harris v. Manor Health Care Corp., 489 N.E.2d 1374, 1377-78 (I11. 1986).
272 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/3-602 (1993).
273 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/3-606, 607 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-
8.1 (West 2005); 63 OKL. ST. ANN. § 1-939 (West 2005); W.VA. CODE § 16-5C-15
(West 2005).
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the terms of arbitration clauses and select the arbitrators to benefit
themselves. In addition to these concerns, nursing home arbitration
with residents is contrary to public policy because of the public nature
of nursing homes, which are largely funded by the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.
Nevertheless, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
has demonstrated it will not take a position protective of residents'
right to a jury trial. While state agencies, like the Arkansas Department
of Health, may advise nursing home operators in their states that they
risk losing certification if they insist upon. imposing unfair mandatory
arbitration agreements on residents, not all states can be counted on to
assume a similar position. Further, the cases with favorable outcomes
for residents and family members offer only patchwork protection.
Nursing homes can easily draft the agreements to correct most
deficiencies that have made them unenforceable. For instance, the
agreements can be drafted to subject all claims to arbitration, including
claims that a nursing home would bring, such as collections claims.
Additionally, the terms can be revised to state that admission is not
conditioned on the resident's agreement to arbitration or to clarify that
arbitration requires waiver of the right to a jury trial.
Therefore, in order to protect residents and their families from
arbitration agreements imposed on them by nursing homes, Congress
should adhere to public polices enunciated by federal and state laws
and amend the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act to prohibit
arbitration agreements in nursing homes.
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